Is That Appropriate?: Clarifying the IDEA\u27s Free Appropriate Public Education Standard Post-Endrew F. by Josh Cowin
Copyright  2018  by  Josh Cowin Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  113,  No.  3 
587 
Notes 
IS THAT APPROPRIATE?: CLARIFYING THE IDEA’S 
FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION 
STANDARD POST-ENDREW F. 
Josh Cowin 
 
ABSTRACT—The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
requires schools to provide all students who qualify for special education 
services with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). However, the 
IDEA does not specify how much substantive educational benefit students 
must be afforded in order to receive a FAPE, leaving this question for the 
courts. For over thirty years, courts split over the amount of educational 
benefit that school districts must provide to their special education students, 
leading to significant confusion and anxiety among parents and school 
officials regarding their legal rights. The Supreme Court sought to clarify 
this standard in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1 by ruling 
that special education students must receive an education that would allow 
them to make “appropriate progress” based on their individual 
circumstances. Unfortunately, the Court’s new standard created additional 
ambiguity and left lingering questions among stakeholders within the 
education community regarding school districts’ obligations to these 
students. This Note addresses these questions by identifying the implications 
of the Court’s appropriate progress standard for students, teachers, and 
school operations, and proposes that courts adopt a two-part test for applying 
the new standard that evaluates both the procedures of particular institutions 
and the substantive value of students’ individualized curricula. Defining the 
FAPE requirement this way would clarify the standard and provide stability 
in an area of law plagued by inconsistency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2015–2016 school year, 6.7 million public school students 
between the ages of three and twenty-one—representing 13% of all public 
school students in the country—received special education services.1 One of 
these students was Endrew F., a fifth-grade boy who was diagnosed with 
autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a child. 
Because of his disabilities, Endrew had problems communicating personal 
needs and emotions, interacting with others in social routines and play, and 
coping with his severe fears of everyday stimuli—such as flies, spills, and 
public restrooms. Endrew also had compulsive and disruptive behaviors that 
surfaced in class, including loud vocalizations, the continuous repetition of 
words and phrases, climbing over furniture and other students, and even 
fleeing the classroom at inappropriate times. All of these obstacles made it 
difficult for Endrew to access education within the traditional public school 
setting. 
 
 1 The Condition of Education - Indicators - Children and Youth with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp (last updated Apr. 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/7MBH-U4ZR]. 
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Endrew’s school attempted to respond to these issues by providing him 
with additional educational support and formulating goals designed 
specifically for him. Despite this extra assistance, however, Endrew still 
struggled to meet his individualized goals and make the appropriate amount 
of academic and social progress for a student of his age.2 While Endrew’s 
circumstances unfortunately mirror those of many similarly situated 
students, his case is particularly notable because it served as the backdrop 
for the most recent decision in special education law—a decision that will 
likely have a significant impact on students, teachers, and administrators in 
the years to come. 
Children with disabilities receive special education services in part 
because of the procedures outlined in the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act of 1990 (IDEA).3 The IDEA mandates that all students with 
disabilities receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE),4 which 
requires school districts to provide each qualifying child with an 
individualized education program (IEP) and any accompanying services that 
the school deems appropriate.5 However, despite the enactment of federal 
legislation attempting to address these issues and the development of 
programs intended to help facilitate student development, children like 
Endrew continue to be neglected. This raises the question: How can school 
districts better ensure that students with disabilities receive a proper 
education? 
Although the IDEA establishes strict and uniform procedures for 
developing an IEP,6 it does not address how substantively challenging the 
IEP must be for students with disabilities. As a result, courts have attempted 
 
 2 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439 (D. Colo. 
Sept. 15, 2014), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 3 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). Congress passed the IDEA as a reauthorization of the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
476, 104 Stat. 1103. 
 4 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The IDEA defines a free appropriate public education as special education 
and related services that (1) have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction 
without charge, (2) meet the standards of the state educational agency, (3) include an appropriate 
preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (4) are provided 
in conformity with the statute’s IEP requirement. Id. § 1401(9). 
 5 Id. § 1412(a)(4). The IDEA defines a “child with a disability” as a child “(i) with intellectual 
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual 
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic impairments, autism, 
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason 
thereof, needs special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A). Either parents, teachers, or 
education agency officials may request that a student be evaluated to determine if the child qualifies as a 
“child with a disability,” and states must conduct the evaluation to determine the educational needs of the 
child within sixty days of a request. Id. § 1414(a)(1). 
 6 See infra Section I.A. 
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to fill in the gaps regarding how much substantive educational benefit 
students must achieve through their IEP to satisfy the requirements of a 
FAPE.7 Prior to the Court’s ruling in Endrew F., the primary Supreme Court 
case addressing this issue was Board of Education v. Rowley8—a case that 
was widely considered to be precedent regarding the educational rights of 
children with disabilities for over thirty years.9 According to Rowley, if a 
student’s IEP explained an educational program that was “reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,” then the FAPE 
requirement was satisfied.10 
However, the Court’s decision in Rowley yielded two divergent 
interpretations. Expounding on the “reasonably calculated” standard, the 
Court indicated that Congress meant for an IEP to require schools to confer 
“some educational benefit,”11 yet the Court also stated that school districts 
must confer a “meaningful” benefit to students through their individualized 
curricula.12 Circuit courts that followed the “some educational benefit” 
interpretation acknowledged that an IEP does not need to guarantee the 
maximization of a child’s potential but instead needs only to provide a 
 
 7 The IDEA grants the Secretary of Education the authority to issue regulations that “are necessary 
to ensure that there is compliance with the specific requirements of [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
However, “[s]ince neither the IDEA nor its regulations [promulgated by the Department of Education] 
include a precise definition of the term appropriate, it is necessary to turn to judicial interpretations for 
guidance on the meaning of FAPE.” ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION 
AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 31 (3d ed. 2014). Ultimately, the Supreme Court is better 
suited to address this interpretation because its decisions are more consistent, given that it will not change 
as presidential administrations change—this allows students and parents to better understand their legal 
rights. See Casey Bayer, DeVos Rescinds Guidance Documents for Disabled Students: What Does It 
Mean?, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/17/ 
10/devos-rescinds-guidance-documents-disabled-students-what-does-it-mean [https://perma.cc/DC2Z-
A8PT] (interviewing Professor Thomas Hehir, former director of the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office on Special Education Programs, regarding Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos’s decision to 
rescind seventy-two guidance documents that provide interpretation for policies and regulations under 
the IDEA). Furthermore, it is more appropriate for courts to address this issue because many of the 
regulations instituted by the Department of Education have political motivations that may be inconsistent 
with congressional intent. See id. (highlighting that the Department of Education’s decision to rescind the 
guidance documents may be part of the Trump Administration’s effort to show that it is “in the business 
of deregulating”). 
 8 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 9 See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An 
Examination of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329, 329 (2008) (stating that “Rowley stands 
firm as the primary precedent whenever the educational rights of children with disabilities are 
considered”); Terry Jean Seligmann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of Special 
Education Law, and What Might Have Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 71 (2012) (“As the first decision by the 
Supreme Court interpreting the IDEA, the case was expected to be a landmark opinion. And in fact, the 
decision in Rowley has remained the standard for interpretation of many aspects of the IDEA.”). 
 10 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
 11 Id. at 200. 
 12 Id. at 192. 
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benefit that is merely more than de minimis.13 In contrast, the circuits that 
followed the “meaningful educational benefit” interpretation argued that 
Congress designed the IDEA to confer more than a trivial benefit to students 
with disabilities.14 The resulting circuit split following Rowley had 
significant consequences for students, parents, and school board officials, 
leaving questions among these individuals regarding their legal rights. 
The Supreme Court finally addressed this split in Endrew F. v. Douglas 
County School District RE-115 by establishing a standard for determining 
how substantively challenging an IEP must be to adequately provide a 
student with a FAPE. In doing so, the Court first noted that judges must 
evaluate IEPs using a standard that is “markedly more demanding than the 
‘merely more than de minimis’ test.”16 The Court further stated that, in order 
for a child to receive a FAPE, the IEP must be “appropriately ambitious” and 
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light 
of the child’s circumstances.”17 However, despite raising the minimum 
benefit requirement above the de minimis threshold, the Court declined to 
establish a bright-line rule for what appropriate progress would look like in 
each individual case; instead, the Court merely stressed that lower courts 
should defer to the judgment of school authorities.18 
Following Endrew F., therefore, there continues to be a wide range of 
interpretations of this new standard among the lower courts, yielding vastly 
different outcomes and creating additional confusion.19 The appropriate 
progress standard established in Endrew F. has left two lingering issues: first, 
what is the practical impact of this standard on students with disabilities and 
the schools they attend; and second, how should district courts interpret 
appropriate progress going forward? One potential benefit of this standard is 
 
 13 See, e.g., Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] school 
district is not required to provide every service that would benefit a student if it has found a formula that 
can reasonably be expected to generate some progress on that student’s IEP goals.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(holding that an IEP was invalid because it afforded no more than trivial progress, contradicting 
Congress’s intent “to afford children with special needs an education that would confer meaningful 
benefit”). 
 15 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 16 Id. at 1000 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 
2015)). 
 17 Id. at 1000–01. 
 18 Id. at 1001. The Endrew F. decision garnered even more mainstream attention because it reversed 
a standard originally stated by then-Circuit judge Neil Gorsuch and became a point of contention during 
his Supreme Court confirmation hearing. See Holly T. Howell, Note, Neil Gorsuch, a Unanimous 
SCOTUS, and a Circuit Split Resolved: What Is the Big “IDEA”?, 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 609–13 
(2017) (describing how Senator Dick Durbin and other Democratic Senators questioned Justice Gorsuch 
about his opinion in Luke P., which was ultimately overturned by the Endrew F. decision). 
 19 See infra Section II.B. 
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that it could supply students who receive special education services with vital 
resources that will assist them in further developing their academic, social, 
and behavioral skills.20 As a consequence of this new standard, however, 
school programs may undergo significant changes, and school administrators 
will likely be forced to make difficult decisions regarding the allocation of 
their limited resources.21 
This Note provides the first comprehensive analysis of these issues and 
their impact on schools and courtrooms and argues that, in spite of its 
ambiguity, Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard requires much-needed 
academic and social benefits to students with special needs. However, while 
Endrew F.’s standard has the potential to greatly protect the interests of 
students with disabilities, the standard could still be clarified so that students, 
parents, and administrators better understand their legal rights. This Note 
thus offers a solution to help resolve this ambiguity by proposing that the 
standard outlined in Endrew F. be understood as a two-part test: first, in 
determining whether an IEP would confer a meaningful benefit, courts 
should evaluate whether the school district’s procedures for developing IEPs 
are adequate; and second, courts should determine whether a student’s IEP 
substantively addresses the specific needs of the student. This Note further 
elaborates on this test by providing objective guidelines for courts to use in 
order to determine whether each part has been satisfied. 
In doing so, this Note proceeds as follows. Part I explains the 
development of IDEA and FAPE jurisprudence, including the Court’s 
holding in Rowley and the circuit split that followed. It then describes the 
changes in education law between Rowley and Endrew F. and assesses how 
legislation enacted during this period may have impacted the holding in 
Endrew F. Next, Part II explores the Endrew F. case in depth and analyzes 
the Court’s reexamination of the FAPE requirement and how district courts 
have interpreted the new appropriate progress standard. Part III examines the 
implications of the appropriate progress standard for school districts and 
argues that requiring the use of a more demanding standard to evaluate IEPs 
will lead to greater inclusion of students with disabilities in general education 
classrooms, force school districts to allocate more resources to special 
education, and cause decreased enrollment of students with disabilities in 
charter schools. Finally, Part IV explains how courts should assess whether 
an IEP would foster appropriate progress by proposing a two-part test that 
helps clarify this ambiguous standard. 
 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 See infra Part III. 
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I. THE IDEA, ROWLEY, AND U.S. EDUCATION LAW PRE-ENDREW F. 
For much of American history, the educational needs of children with 
disabilities were not being fully met—schools were not providing these 
students with appropriate educational services that addressed their specific 
needs, certain children were excluded entirely from the public school system, 
and public schools did not possess adequate resources, which ultimately 
forced families to find educational services outside the public school 
system.22 In response to these issues, Congress enacted the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) in 197523 and later reauthorized 
EAHCA in 1990, changing the language of the law to emphasize the 
individual student (instead of the condition) and renaming the law the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.24 
While the IDEA provides uniform procedural rights for students with 
disabilities, interpretations of the substantive FAPE standard were highly 
inconsistent and were further complicated by shifts in the legal landscape of 
education law between the Court’s decisions in Rowley and Endrew F. This 
Part provides a brief background of the IDEA’s procedural requirements, the 
establishment of Rowley’s substantive FAPE standard, and the disparate 
interpretations of this standard that subsequently ensued. This Part then 
examines how the enactment of laws that provided increased protections for 
students with disabilities may have ultimately influenced the Court’s 
decision in Endrew F. 
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In 1990, Congress passed the IDEA as a reauthorization of EAHCA25 
in response to public perception that a majority of children with disabilities 
“were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular 
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’”26 
Congress acknowledged the necessity of this law because “[i]mproving 
educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of 
[the United States’] national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity . . . 
for individuals with disabilities.”27 In order to resolve these issues, Congress 
 
 22 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Mitchell L. Yell et al., The Legal History of Special Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s 
Been!, 19 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 219, 226 (1998). 
 25 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. 
 26 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975) (citing Investigation of the Adequacy of Federal and Other 
Resources for Education and Training of the Handicapped: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on 
the Handicapped of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 89th Cong. (1966)). 
 27 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). The purposes of the IDEA include ensuring that children with disabilities 
possess special education and related services designed both to meet their unique needs and to prepare 
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enacted the IDEA, which aimed to provide federal monetary assistance to 
state and local school systems so they would have the resources necessary to 
address the educational needs of students with disabilities.28 
A state can qualify for this federal monetary assistance by submitting a 
plan to the Secretary of Education outlining the policies and procedures it 
will enact to ensure each of its students receives a FAPE.29 In order to achieve 
this, the IDEA specifically requires a state to guarantee that each child with 
a disability receives a uniquely tailored individualized education program 
(IEP).30 To develop an IEP, educators, parents, and specialists evaluate a 
student’s particular strengths and weaknesses and decide which special 
services will be required for the student to achieve individualized goals. The 
IEP is then prepared at a meeting with the student’s parents, the regular 
education teacher, at least one special education teacher, and a qualified 
member of the local educational agency.31 IEP goals can address several 
different areas of student development, ranging from achieving specific 
academic benchmarks to satisfying broader behavioral goals.32 Among other 
things, the IEP must include statements about the student’s present levels of 
academic achievement and functional performance, measurable annual 
academic and functional goals, a description of how the child’s progress will 
be measured, specific special education services that will be provided, and 
an explanation of the extent to which the child will be educated outside the 
regular classroom.33 The IDEA also requires that the IEP be periodically 
“developed, reviewed, and revised for each child.”34 
 
them for further education, employment, and independent living; assisting local and federal agencies in 
implementing special education plans; helping implement early intervention services for infants and 
toddlers with disabilities and their families; and ensuring that educators and parents have the necessary 
tools to improve educational results for children with disabilities. Id. § 1400(d)(1)–(3). 
 28 Id. § 1411(a). In 2013–2014, the federal government provided IDEA grants at a rate of $1743 per 
student with a disability, which equaled 14.5% of the average expenditure per general education student. 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 31 
(2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget16/summary/16summary.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/9TMA-PMOG]. 
 29 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). 
 30 Id. § 1412(a)(4). 
 31 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 32 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF SPECIAL EDUC. TEACHERS, COMPLETED SAMPLE IEP 2–8 (2017), 
http://depts.washington.edu/lend/building_skills_files/5%20IEP%20C%20%20Sample_Distance%20Le
arners%20for%20webposting_2-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/95WF-9YVB]. 
 33 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 34 Id. § 1412(a)(4). If parents or guardians of students with disabilities are unsatisfied with their 
child’s education, the IDEA allows them to present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to 
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child.” Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). These complaints must be resolved through an 
impartial due process hearing, id. § 1415(f)(1)(A), and any aggrieved party may appeal the findings of 
the hearing to the state educational agency to be reviewed by an administrative official, id. § 1415(g)(1). 
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In addition to the FAPE requirement, the IDEA also requires that 
students with disabilities are educated in the least restrictive environment 
(LRE).35 The LRE concept originated from procedural and substantive due 
process doctrines and equal protection principles.36 The IDEA’s LRE 
mandate stresses that students with disabilities should be taught as much as 
possible in general education classrooms and should only be removed from 
the regular educational environment and placed into a self-contained special 
education classroom37 if their disability hinders their ability to achieve a 
satisfactory education.38 
While the IDEA outlines rigorous procedural obligations for school 
districts, it does not contain any substantive standard regarding the level of 
educational benefit that an IEP must provide to students with disabilities in 
order for them to adequately receive FAPEs. This omission has thus left the 
courts in the position of devising an appropriate standard. 
 
Any party aggrieved by the findings of the state administrative hearing possesses “the right to bring a 
civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district 
court of the United States . . . .” Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
 35 Id. § 1412(a)(5). 
 36 See, e.g., Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment, Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for 
Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis and Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 171 
(2010); Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of 
Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 840 (2002) (“The placement of 
children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment is founded on equal protection 
principles . . . .”); Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 648 (1995) (“[T]he legislative history of the [IDEA] shows that Congress 
viewed the categorical segregation of children with disabilities as a matter of constitutional dimension. 
Due process protections were enacted in part to assure that every child with a disability is ‘in fact’ afforded 
an education in the ‘least restrictive environment.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 15 (1975)). 
 37 A self-contained classroom typically consists of five to ten special education students and is led 
by a special education teacher or paraeducator, who “focuses on the idea of smaller groups, a more close-
knit environment, and one-on-one attention, which can help children with special needs feel safe while 
fostering creativity and learning.” Suzie Dalien, Self-Contained Classroom Defined, SPECIAL EDUC. RES. 
(Nov. 11, 2014, 9:08 PM), https://specialedresource.com/resource-center/self-contained-classroom-
defined [https://perma.cc/QC5K-CSFL]. 
 38 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that students with disabilities should be “educated with children 
who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities 
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a 
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily”). In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA in part in response to circuit court cases 
interpreting the LRE provision. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37; Farley, supra note 36, at 816. The 1997 Amendments strengthened the 
LRE provision by stressing the importance of including students with disabilities in general education 
classrooms. Farley, supra note 36, at 816. Upon signing the Amendments, President Clinton lauded this 
approach, emphasizing that the bill helped “put[] an even sharper focus on improving educational results 
for these children through greater access to the general curriculum.” Statement on Signing the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 1 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (June 4, 1997). 
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B. Rowley and the Court’s Initial Articulation of the FAPE Standard 
The Supreme Court first examined the FAPE standard in Board of 
Education v. Rowley.39 In Rowley, the parents of a deaf student argued that 
their child’s IEP was insufficient because it did not require the presence of a 
qualified sign language interpreter in each of the student’s academic 
classes.40 Instead, the IEP included a provision requiring the teacher to speak 
into a wireless transmitter in order to amplify her words.41 Though Rowley 
advanced easily from grade to grade under this program,42 the district court 
held that Rowley’s IEP was inadequate because it did not provide her with 
“an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the 
opportunity provided to other children.”43 
While the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling, the Supreme Court 
reversed, lambasting the district court’s “equal opportunity” standard 
because it would require judges to make impossible measurements and 
comparisons.44 The Court stated that there was “no additional requirement 
that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential 
‘commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.’”45 Using this 
rationale, it found that Rowley’s excellent progress and the specialized 
instruction offered in her IEP satisfied the IDEA’s FAPE requirement.46 
Ultimately, the Court declined to establish a bright-line test for determining 
the adequacy of educational benefits afforded to children with disabilities47 
and, instead, merely stated that the FAPE requirement is satisfied if the IEP 
explains an educational program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefits.”48 
Expounding on this “reasonably calculated” standard, the Court in its 
opinion noted that Congress meant for an IEP to require “some educational 
benefit,”49 while simultaneously stating that school districts must confer a 
 
 39 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Although the Court interpreted the FAPE standard under the EAHCA, the 
IDEA possesses the same FAPE requirement that was addressed in Rowley. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (requiring that states provide each child who has a disability a free appropriate public 
education). 
 40 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 185. 
 43 Id. at 185–86. 
 44 Id. at 198. 
 45 Id. (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 46 Id. at 202–03. 
 47 Id. at 202. 
 48 Id. at 207. 
 49 Id. at 200. 
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“meaningful” benefit.50 This seemingly contradictory language led lower 
courts to subsequently adopt vastly different interpretations regarding the 
amount of benefit that must be conferred to students with disabilities through 
their IEPs. As a result, for more than thirty years, courts reached different 
decisions for cases with seemingly identical facts, leaving parents and school 
board officials confused about their legal rights under the IDEA. 
C. “Some Educational Benefit” vs. “Meaningful Educational Benefit” 
The Court’s decision in Rowley led to a debate among school attorneys 
and advocates over whether the FAPE standard required that students with 
disabilities receive either a “meaningful educational benefit” or “some 
educational benefit.”51 The fact that certain circuits utilized both standards 
further added to the confusion,52 and the ambiguity and inconsistency 
surrounding the use of the “meaningful educational benefit” and “some 
educational benefit” standards even led one district judge to question 
whether there was truly a difference between them at all.53 This Section 
attempts to answer that question by examining the distinctions between these 
two standards. First, this Section outlines the origins of these standards in 
Rowley, and then it concludes by discussing circuit court case law addressing 
each standard with a focus on how these varying interpretations yielded 
disparate results. 
1. The “Some Educational Benefit” Standard 
The “some educational benefit” standard originally derived from the 
Court’s decision in Rowley.54 Prior to the Court’s decision in Endrew F., the 
majority of circuit courts exclusively used a variation of the “some 
educational benefit” test to evaluate whether an IEP satisfied the FAPE 
 
 50 Id. at 192. 
 51 See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has 
Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2009) (comparing various circuit courts’ 
interpretations of Rowley in different contexts). 
 52 Compare, e.g., Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the evidence did not support a finding that a child’s IEP was inadequate to provide the student with 
an appropriate education because an IEP must only be designed to confer some educational benefit), with 
Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a student was entitled 
to public funding of his or her attendance at a private school under the IDEA because the IEP must be 
reasonably calculated to provide some meaningful benefit). 
 53 See Blake C. v. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (D. Haw. 2009) (“Various opinions 
have left it ambiguous as to what the precise difference, if any, is between ‘meaningful’ benefit and 
‘some’ benefit.” (quoting Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008))). 
 54 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (“Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a ‘free 
appropriate public education’ is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be 
sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982))). 
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requirement.55 The decisions from these circuits demonstrate that the 
application of this standard afforded only limited protection for students with 
disabilities. For instance, the Tenth Circuit applied the “some educational 
benefit” standard in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P.56 and stated 
that an IEP must provide a benefit that “must merely be ‘more than de 
minimis.’”57 In another case, the Tenth Circuit also noted that, while an IEP 
must be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits to a child with 
disabilities, the student’s education does not need to be “guaranteed to 
maximize the child’s potential.”58 
The Sixth Circuit applied an infamous interpretation of the “some 
educational benefit” standard in Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma 
City Schools.59 In Doe, a student had qualified for special education services 
because of a neurological impairment that hindered his ability to process 
auditory information and engage in normal language and thinking skills.60 
Doe’s parents alleged that the IEP provided by their student’s public school 
was inadequate and that their child could only receive a FAPE by enrolling 
in a private school specifically for children with learning disabilities.61 The 
parents sued the school district in order to compel funding for their child’s 
private school education.62 The Sixth Circuit held that under the “some 
educational benefit” standard, an IEP must only “provide the educational 
 
 55 See, e.g., Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1317 (finding that the IEP “provided adequate generalization 
services for [the child] to receive some educational benefit”); Lt. TB. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 
80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, . . . IDEA 
does not require a public school to provide what is best for a special needs child . . . .”); A.B. v. Lawson, 
354 F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“IDEA’s FAPE standards are far more modest than to require that a 
child excel or thrive. The requirement is satisfied when the state provides the disabled child with 
‘personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from 
the instruction.’” (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203)); Devine v. Indian River Cty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 
1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] student is only entitled to some educational benefit; the benefit need 
not be maximized to be adequate.”); Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(“The standard to judge whether an IEP is appropriate under IDEA is whether it offers instruction and 
supportive services reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit to the student for whom it 
is designed.”); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“There seems 
to be little doubt that [the child] would have made less progress under the District of Columbia program, 
but Rowley precludes our taking that factor into account so long as the public-school alternative confers 
some educational benefit.”). 
 56 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 57 Id. at 1149 (quoting Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 58 Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1313. 
 59 9 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 60 Id. at 456. 
 61 Id. at 456–57. 
 62 Id. at 457. Under the IDEA, if parents of a child with a disability choose to take their child out of 
public school and enroll him or her in a private school, a court may require the public school to reimburse 
the parents for the costs of the private school enrollment if the court finds that the public school had not 
made a FAPE available to that student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2012). 
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equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet . . . [and] that the Board [of Education] 
is not required to provide a Cadillac.”63 Ultimately, the courts’ decisions in 
these cases illustrate that the implementation of the “some educational 
benefit” standard has provided only limited protection to students with 
disabilities. 
2. The “Meaningful Educational Benefit” Standard 
In contrast to the “some educational benefit” standard, prior to the 
Court’s Endrew F. decision, the Third Circuit was the only one that 
exclusively applied the “meaningful educational benefit” standard,64 
although the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all previously utilized 
the standard in at least some cases.65 Courts that applied the more demanding 
“meaningful educational benefit” standard all provided greater protection for 
students with disabilities.66 
The Third Circuit explained the difference between the “some 
educational benefit” and “meaningful educational benefit” standards in Polk 
 
 63 Doe, 9 F.3d at 459–60. 
 64 See, e.g., Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
school must establish that it complied with the procedures set out in the IDEA and that the IEP was 
‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the 
child’s ‘intellectual potential.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982))); T.R. v. 
Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s holding 
because the court relied on evidence that satisfied “the somewhat more stringent ‘meaningful benefit’ 
test”); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding an IEP 
invalid because it afforded no more than trivial progress, while “Congress intended to afford children 
with special needs an education that would confer meaningful benefit”). 
 65 See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist. 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that “[u]nder the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school district must provide a student with a 
‘meaningful benefit’ in order to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA” (quoting Adams v. 
Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999))); Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“At the very least, the intent of Congress appears to have been to require a program 
providing a meaningful educational benefit towards the goal of self-sufficiency . . . . Indeed, states 
providing no more than some educational benefit could not possibly hope to attain the lofty goals 
proclaimed by Congress.”); Adams, 195 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the IDEA requires that an IEP “be 
reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child”); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the IDEA mandated that “the door of public education 
must be opened for a disabled child in a ‘meaningful’ way,” and IEPs that only afford the opportunity for 
trivial advancement do not meet the IDEA’s requirements (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192)); Cypress-
Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the IDEA’s 
reference to educational benefit means that the benefit must be meaningful and “likely to produce 
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement”). 
 66 The courts that utilized the heightened “meaningful educational benefit” standard argued that it 
was appropriate based on the following language from Rowley: 
By passing the [Education for All Handicapped Children Act], Congress sought primarily to make 
public education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide such access to public 
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard 
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. 
458 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added). 
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v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16.67 There, a student with 
encephalopathy, a brain disease similar to cerebral palsy, alleged that the 
school district did not provide him with an adequate IEP because it did not 
include weekly hands-on physical therapy from licensed physical therapists, 
hindering his progress and ability to meet his educational goals.68 The Third 
Circuit held that there was “evidence in the record that would support a 
finding that the program prescribed for [Polk] afforded no more than trivial 
progress.”69 The court justified its use of the “meaningful educational 
benefit” standard by explaining that it would contravene Congress’s intent 
in passing the IDEA to allow states to receive federal funding for making the 
“idle gesture” of providing only trivial benefits.70 
Ultimately, Rowley caused deep disagreement among the circuit courts 
over which of the two standards was most appropriate. This disagreement, 
and the resulting inconsistent rulings, eventually prompted the Supreme 
Court to address the issue in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District 
RE-1.71 In addition to resolving the two divergent standards, however, the 
Court also needed to consider whether the drastic changes in the landscape 
of education law post-Rowley would impact its interpretation of the 
substantive FAPE standard. The next Section addresses these changes. 
D. Changes in Education Law Between Rowley and Endrew F. 
After Rowley, Congress passed three education-based laws intended to 
provide better educational opportunities to students with disabilities: the 
1997 Amendments to the IDEA, the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA 
following the No Child Left Behind Act, and the Every Student Succeeds 
Act of 2015. First, the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA strengthened the 
IDEA’s requirement that children with disabilities must be educated in 
general education classrooms to the maximum extent appropriate.72 The 
Amendments further established presumptions that students with disabilities 
participate in the general curriculum, required general education teachers to 
 
 67 853 F.2d at 180–85. 
 68 Id. at 172. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 184. 
 71 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 72 Paolo Annino, The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA: Improving the Quality of Special Education 
for Children with Disabilities, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 125, 125 (1999). This 
requirement is now codified in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, 
children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs 
only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with 
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (emphasis added)). 
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participate in the creation of IEPs, and prohibited any funding mechanism 
that favors placement in a nongeneral curriculum or segregated setting.73 
Second, Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004 in order to make it 
consistent with the No Child Left Behind Act.74 Among other things, the 
reauthorization created a Highly Qualified Teacher requirement75 for special 
education teachers, required schools to administer state assessments for all 
students (including children with disabilities), and mandated that states 
identify and address preparation and professional development needs for 
individuals who provide direct services to children with disabilities.76 
Finally, the Obama Administration’s Every Student Succeeds Act of 201577 
further addressed the needs of students with disabilities by requiring school 
districts to align all IEPs with state academic content standards, include 
students with disabilities in their administration of statewide assessments, 
and offer alternate assessments for students with more severe disabilities.78 
Taken together, Congress’s legislative actions after Rowley appeared to 
heighten the substantive and procedural protections for students with 
disabilities as well as the expectations for their teachers. As school districts 
began to implement these newly enacted initiatives, courts struggled with 
whether these changes to the legislative landscape should impact their 
interpretations of Rowley.79 These questions loomed large as the Supreme 
Court considered the case of Endrew F. 
 
 73 Annino, supra note 72, at 125–26 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5)(B), 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii)(i), 
(B)(ii)). 
 74 See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., IDEA – REAUTHORIZED STATUTE: ALIGNMENT WITH THE NO CHILD 
LEFT BEHIND ACT, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/tb-nclb-align.doc [https://perma.cc/ 
72HC-TW33] (outlining that the IDEA altered its provisions regarding definitions, allocations of funds, 
performance goals, reporting, eligibility, and development plans to be consistent with the Bush 
Administration’s No Child Left Behind Act). 
 75 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 
2647, 2686 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(C)). The Highly Qualified Teacher requirement 
mandated that teachers possess bachelor’s degrees, full state certification or licensure, and knowledge of 
the subject they taught, which is demonstrated based on a combination of teaching experience, 
professional development, and knowledge in a subject garnered from the teacher’s higher education or 
over time through their experience in the profession. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: NEW NO CHILD 
LEFT BEHIND FLEXIBILITY: HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS (2004), https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/methods/ 
teachers/hqtflexibility.html [https://perma.cc/F2QW-9CB5]. 
 76 118 Stat. at 2685–87 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14), (16)(C)). 
 77 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 78 PSEA EDUC. SERVS. DIV., THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: SPECIAL EDUCATION 
REQUIREMENTS 1 (2018), https://www.psea.org/globalassets/for-members/psea-advisories/advisory-
essa-specialeducation.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7JJ-CDDT]. 
 79 Compare N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that “[u]nder the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school must provide a student with a ‘meaningful 
benefit’ in order to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA” (quoting Adams v. Oregon, 195 
F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999))), with LT. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) 
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II. REEXAMINING THE FAPE STANDARD IN ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Endrew F. to resolve the circuit 
split that had developed post-Rowley over the FAPE requirement. While the 
Court’s decision in Endrew F. ultimately provided a new standard for 
evaluating whether a student’s IEP provided a FAPE, it also raised new 
questions regarding how lower courts should interpret that new standard. 
This Part highlights these issues by analyzing Endrew F.’s holding and 
discussing its varying interpretations by district courts. 
A. Endrew F. and the Court’s New Articulation of the FAPE Standard 
Endrew, a student who was diagnosed with autism at age two, attended 
school in the Douglas County School District from preschool through fourth 
grade.80 During his fourth-grade year, Endrew’s parents complained that his 
IEP largely carried over the same basic goals and objectives from year to 
year instead of creating new, individualized yearly goals based on relevant 
data and that, as a result, Endrew continually failed to make meaningful 
academic and functional progress.81 Because of this, Endrew’s parents 
eventually removed him from public school and enrolled him in a private 
school that specialized in educating children with autism.82 
Endrew’s private school instituted a unique behavior intervention plan83 
that resulted in dramatic improvements to his behavioral and academic 
progress.84 Six months later, Endrew’s parents again met with Douglas 
County School District representatives to discuss his IEP in light of his recent 
progress, and the school district developed a new IEP for Endrew.85 
However, Endrew’s parents claimed this new IEP yet again did not 
meaningfully differ from the one developed the previous year, nor did it 
incorporate the successful interventions utilized by his private school.86 
 
(rejecting parents’ argument that the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA changed the Rowley standard to 
require school districts to provide each student with special needs the maximum benefit). 
 80 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 A behavior intervention plan “is a concrete plan of action for reducing problem behaviors, dictated 
by the particular needs of the student exhibiting the behaviors.” Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional 
Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
175, 175 (2011) (citing H. Rutherford Turnbull III et al., Public Policy Foundations for Positive 
Behavioral Interventions, Strategies, and Supports, 2 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 218 (2000)). 
While behavior intervention plans are not required components of an IEP, they are frequently included 
by IEP teams as part of the student’s individualized program. See id. at 188–89. 
 84 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996–97. 
 85 Id. at 997. 
 86 Id. 
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Endrew’s parents rejected the school district’s proposed IEP, arguing that it 
denied their son a FAPE because it “was not ‘reasonably calculated to enable 
[Endrew] to receive educational benefits.’”87 As a result, Endrew’s parents 
filed a complaint with the Colorado Department of Education seeking 
reimbursement for his private school tuition.88   
After an administrative law hearing and adjudications in federal court, 
Endrew’s case reached the Supreme Court in 2016.89 During oral argument, 
both parties advanced vastly different interpretations of how the Court 
should decide whether an IEP satisfies the FAPE requirement. According to 
Endrew’s attorney, the interpretation of the standard should derive from the 
IDEA’s text stating that a school’s services should be “reasonably calculated 
to provide [students with disabilities] substantially equal educational 
opportunities [to those offered to other students].”90 But the Justices were 
skeptical about how this ambitious standard would be applied in practice.91 
In particular, Justice Kennedy appeared concerned about the cost of this 
proposed standard,92 and Justice Breyer expressed his worry that judges 
lacking expertise in education would interpret this standard inconsistently.93 
While most of the Justices did not appear persuaded by Endrew’s 
proposed ambitious standard, they unanimously agreed that the “some 
educational benefit,” “merely more than de minimis” test introduced by the 
school district was problematic. Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s 
precedent in Rowley specifically required that an IEP provide “enough 
benefit to keep track with grade progress,” and “that’s . . . slightly more than 
de minimis.”94 Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the 1997 Amendments 
to the IDEA and the 2004 reauthorization stressed that students with 
disabilities must make progress in general education, which also results in a 
more stringent standard than de minimis.95 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reevaluated the Court’s 
holding in Rowley and ultimately dismissed the school district’s argument, 
 
 87 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 29 (2016). 
 90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15–827), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-827_gfbh.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VN2G-8XD4]. 
 91 See id. at 4–9, 13–18. 
 92 See id. at 8–9. 
 93 See id. at 13–14. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan also noted that the IDEA stresses 
flexibility and that a proper standard must address those students who may not be able to follow the 
general education curriculum. See id. at 6–7, 18. 
 94 Id. at 35–36. 
 95 Id. at 38. 
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noting that “th[e] standard is markedly more demanding than the ‘merely 
more than de minimis’ test.”96 However, the opinion also rejected Endrew’s 
parents’ argument that the FAPE requirement is only satisfied if it provides 
a child with a disability opportunities equal to those afforded to children 
without disabilities.97 Finding a middle ground, the Court held that the IDEA 
“requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to 
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”98 
In reaching its decision, the Court further stated that a child’s 
“educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his 
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately 
ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, 
but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”99 
However, like in Rowley, the Court declined to establish a bright-line rule 
that elaborated on what appropriate progress would actually entail, stressing 
that courts should instead defer to the judgment of school authorities on that 
particular question.100 
B. Endrew F.’s Initial Interpretation in the Lower Courts 
While the Endrew F. decision heightened the requirements for what 
constituted a FAPE, courts have struggled to articulate a clear expectation of 
what this new standard means in practice.101 Given how recently the Court 
decided Endrew F., there has been limited case law interpreting the decision. 
However, various courts have already begun applying different criteria in 
their interpretations of the FAPE standard, creating further inconsistencies 
and confusion across jurisdictions.102 This Section examines how courts have 
 
 96 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993, 1000–01 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 
798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 97 Id. at 1001. 
 98 Id. (emphasis added). 
 99 Id. at 1000 (emphasis added). During oral argument, the Justices, particularly Justice Breyer, 
lauded this standard because it came directly from the Department of Education and was regarded as the 
most consistent with existing law. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Proper 
Standard for Measuring Educational Benefits for Children with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 
2017, 6:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-proper-
standard-measuring-educational-benefits-children-disabilities [https://perma.cc/ZG9L-PVQ5]. 
 100 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001–02. 
 101 This is problematic considering that scholars have previously stated that “Rowley stands firm as 
the primary precedent whenever the educational rights of children with disabilities are considered,” Mead 
& Paige, supra note 9, at 329, and the Court’s decision in Endrew F., which reassessed and reformulated 
the Rowley standard, will likely have a similarly significant impact on these students and their legal rights. 
 102 See Perry A. Zirkel, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas Country School 
District RE-1: A Meaningful Raising of the Bar?, 341 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 545, 551 (2017) (“The 
immediate effect [of Endrew F.] on the lower courts’ FAPE cases illustrates the uncertainty [of its impact] 
at least for the near future.”). 
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dealt with this new standard thus far by reviewing three district court cases 
from different jurisdictions, decided post-Endrew F., and evaluating how 
these varying approaches have prompted new questions that courts will have 
to address going forward. 
1. District Court Decisions Post-Endrew F. 
While current case law interpreting Endrew F. is limited, the following 
three district court opinions reveal important trends, as well as some 
inconsistencies, in courts’ interpretations of the new standard. First, in Paris 
School District v. A.H.,103 the court considered the IEP of a child with autism 
and found it did not satisfy the FAPE requirement.104 In reaching its decision, 
the court found that the school district failed to respond quickly to 
developing a behavior management plan105 and that it ignored the nuances of 
behaviors that manifest with autism.106 The court concluded that Endrew F. 
imposed heightened requirements for IEPs and that the district’s plans were 
inadequate “especially in light of the higher standard of Endrew F. that must 
now be applied.”107 
Conversely, the court in Board of Education v. Maez108 held that the IEP 
developed for a student with autism appropriately satisfied the FAPE 
requirement under the Endrew F. standard.109 The court found that the 
student’s IEP incorporated numerous teaching techniques, “which in total 
were appropriately ambitious and likely to provide . . . some educational 
benefit in light of his unique circumstances.”110 The court used the term 
“some” again later in the opinion when it highlighted the student’s unique 
circumstances, stating that the IEP was proper because the student was 
making “some meaningful progress, even if it was not the exact type of 
progress that [the p]arents would have wanted.”111 
Finally, in Parker C. v. West Chester Area School District,112 the court 
found that a child with disabilities adequately received a FAPE due to his 
immense progress and reasonably calculated IEP in light of his 
 
 103 No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 104 Id. at *8. 
 105 Id. at *7. Behavior management plans are detailed plans created through the IEP process and 
included as a part of the student’s IEP that are designed to “essentially teach a child proper behavior 
through specified methods.” Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who Is Eligible Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 323 (2006). 
 106 A.H., 2017 WL 1234151, at *8. 
 107 Id. (emphasis added). 
 108 No. 16-cv-1082, 2017 WL 3278945 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017). 
 109 Id. at *14. 
 110 Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
 111 Id. at *13 (emphasis added). 
 112 No. 16-4836, 2017 WL 2888573 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). 
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circumstances.113 During the due process proceedings,114 a question arose as 
to whether the hearing officer applied the proper standard when evaluating 
the circumstances.115 The court stated that resolution of this dispute was 
“irrelevant” because the “meaningful educational benefit” standard already 
employed by the Third Circuit applied in its review in light of the Endrew F. 
holding.116 While these three decisions acknowledge that Endrew F. 
heightened the standard by requiring that the educational benefit be “more 
demanding than the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test,”117 there are still 
important differences in how courts evaluated the appropriate progress 
standard. 
2. Emergence of New Questions 
Several new questions have presented themselves following the Court’s 
decision in Endrew F. First, the three opinions discussed above confirmed 
Endrew F.’s acknowledgement that the creation of an IEP is a “‘fact-
intensive exercise’ and that it ‘will be informed not only by the expertise of 
school officials, but also by the input of the child’s parents or guardians.’”118 
These district courts highlighted Endrew F.’s contention that “the IEP must 
be evaluated through the lens of the student’s ‘present level of achievement, 
disability, and potential for growth.’”119 But this inquiry will likely differ 
depending on the court’s particular expectations of a child with disabilities 
based on his or her circumstances—Endrew F. even acknowledges that there 
are infinite variations about what is obtainable for students.120 Therefore, 
establishing a fact-based inquiry to determine what reasonably constitutes 
appropriate progress in these decisions presents possible issues for district 
courts moving forward. 
Furthermore, after Rowley and Endrew F., it is still unclear how much 
deference a court should give school administrators. While Rowley 
 
 113 Id. at *13. 
 114 For further discussion of the due process proceedings outlined under the IDEA, see supra note 
34. 
 115 Parker C., 2017 WL 2888573, at *7. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 992 (2017) (quoting Endrew F. v. 
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 118 Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017) 
(quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999); see also Parker C., 2017 WL 2888573, at *6 (“[S]chool districts 
must work with parents to design an IEP . . . . The instruction offered must be specially designed to meet 
a child’s unique needs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-CV-1082, 
2017 WL 3278945, at *14 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017) (“The Supreme Court in Endrew F. recently reiterated 
that the adequacy of an IEP turns on the unique attributes of the child for which it is created.”). 
 119 Maez, 2017 WL 3278945, at *14 (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999). 
 120 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
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acknowledged that courts should defer to school administrators on 
“questions of methodology”—the specific educational tactics being 
utilized121—it did not mandate that courts defer on the question of whether a 
particular IEP appropriately provides a FAPE.122 The Court in Endrew F. 
stated that lower courts should defer to school authorities based on their 
expertise and exercise of judgment yet declined to elaborate on what 
appropriate progress would look like from case to case.123 In the same 
paragraph, however, the Court lauded the procedural nature of the IEP 
process and the reviewing authority’s ability to evaluate “cogent and 
responsive explanations” for decisions made by a school district.124 This 
ambiguity may ultimately cause courts to differ on the level of deference 
they provide to school administrators, which would produce different 
outcomes across jurisdictions despite similar facts being presented in any 
given case. 
Finally, the limited district court cases decided so far have interpreted 
Endrew F.’s language differently. There is a possible split emerging among 
the circuits that previously followed the “some educational benefit” standard, 
especially in light of the fact that these courts are trying to reconcile the 
Endrew F. standard with its Rowley precedent. While some courts have 
found that Endrew F. overruled Rowley and requires a heightened 
standard,125 others are still using the “some educational benefit” language, 
indicating that the decision has not altered their fact-specific evaluation.126 
In contrast, other courts have found that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress 
standard does not alter Rowley’s “meaningful educational benefit” test.127 
 
 121 See Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special 
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 233 (2005) (stating that courts do not possess 
specialized knowledge and expertise to resolve educational policy questions and thus must defer to states 
on preferable educational methods). 
 122 Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Education Program Requirements Under the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been and Where Should We Be Going?, 
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 504 (1991) (“What Rowley commands, however, is deference to the 
school authorities on questions of methodology and policy, not on questions of whether an IEP constitutes 
a FAPE.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 123 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. 
 124 Id. at 1002. 
 125 See Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 
2017) (“In comparing [the Endrew F. standard] to the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test—previously 
the law of the Eighth Circuit—the Court held that ‘this standard is markedly more demanding.’” (quoting 
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000)). 
 126 See Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-CV-1082, 2017 WL 3278945, at *8 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017) 
(noting that the IEP was “appropriately ambitious and likely to provide [the student] with some 
educational benefit in light of his unique circumstances”). 
 127 See, e.g., Parker C. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. CV 16-4836, 2017 WL 2888573, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (declining to address whether the hearing officer applied the incorrect standard 
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Incorporating the “meaningful educational benefit” standard to evaluate the 
FAPE standard is questionable, however, given that Endrew F. never 
explicitly mentions “meaningful educational benefit,” nor did the opinion 
choose to adopt either standard utilized by district courts following Rowley 
or offered by either party at oral argument.128 These cases demonstrate the 
varying impact of Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard on courts’ 
evaluation of what constitutes a FAPE and may indicate how this divergence 
will develop in the future.129 
III. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE ENDREW F. STANDARD 
Despite the fact-specific nature of the FAPE standard, district courts all 
agree that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard now requires that an 
IEP’s educational benefit be “more demanding than the ‘merely more than 
de minimis’ test.”130 Additionally, since Endrew F., there has been an 
emphasis on meeting specific requirements highlighted in the Endrew F. 
opinion—namely, that in order to guarantee that a student receives a FAPE, 
school districts must provide students with disabilities individualized 
accommodations, include special education students in general education 
classrooms, and make decisions about an IEP using cogent analysis.131 As a 
result, Endrew F.’s heightened standard for a FAPE should lead to 
significant changes for both special education students and schools—
 
because he applied the “meaningful educational benefit” standard, which remains valid in light of Endrew 
F.). 
 128 Janet R. Decker & Sarah Hurwitz, Post-Endrew Legal Implications for Students with Autism 
Introduction, 344 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 31, 35 (2017) (acknowledging that “[t]he Endrew Court 
resolved the split in the circuits not by adopting one of these [conflicting] standards, but by creating a 
new standard”). 
 129 Maureen MacFarlane, legal counsel for Cambridge Public Schools in Massachusetts, even went 
so far as to say that “[o]ne might posit that based upon the cases that have been issued to date there is 
likely to be, over time, another split in the circuits as to how to interpret the standard[] that ha[s] been 
articulated in . . . Endrew.” Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate 
Education”: Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 539, 557 (2017). 
 130 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 992 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 
1338 (10th Cir. 2015)); see also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Endrew 
Decision Creates Important New Opportunities for Students with Disabilities, COUNCIL OF PARENT 
ATT’YS & ADVOCS. (Sept. 2017), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/resmgr/docs/ 
accessible_2017/Endrew_paper_LH__9-8-17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCQ2-4RR3] (“Endrew rejects the 
bigotry of low expectations that marked prior interpretations of Rowley. It requires that schools provide 
special education that is designed to help students with disabilities become academically 
proficient . . . .”). 
 131 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (“[A] FAPE will involve integration in the regular classroom 
and individualized special education calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade.”); id. at 
1002 (“A reviewing court may fairly expect [school] authorities to be able to offer a cogent and responsive 
explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make 
progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”). 
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especially for those residing in circuits that previously followed the “some 
educational benefit” standard.132 For one, this new standard provides special 
education students with much-needed resources that will assist them in 
further developing their academic, social, and behavioral skills.133 Many of 
these children had been neglected by the policies and programs instituted at 
their schools in jurisdictions that previously utilized the de minimis standard. 
Under the Court’s new standard, school districts and administrators will now 
have to provide these students with enhanced individualized curricula, 
supplemental aids, and other important resources.134 
While the new standard does appear to increase the protections for 
students with disabilities, it also should have a significant impact on school 
structuring and the resources that are allocated to other students. Because the 
Court raised the FAPE standard above the de minimis threshold, it is 
probable that certain school districts will now have to significantly alter their 
existing programming, and school administrators will be forced to make 
difficult decisions about how to allocate their already-limited resources in 
order to adequately fund the programming and resources that Endrew F. 
requires. 
This Part analyzes these issues further by highlighting the areas of 
education most likely to be impacted by the Endrew F. decision: the 
integration of students with disabilities into general education classrooms, 
resource allocation within public schools, and the role of charter schools in 
providing education to children with special needs. 
 
 132 See Julie Waterstone, Endrew F., Symbolism v. Reality, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 527, 532 (2017) (“For 
those children with special needs living in the Tenth Circuit, they will unquestionably feel a difference 
because their quality of program has been elevated through this decision.”). While the IDEA already 
required, and schools already provided, some of the programs and services discussed in this Part to some 
extent, it is probable that the heightened FAPE standard will force more schools to implement the policies 
outlined in this Part; otherwise, schools increase the risk of facing lawsuits. See Terry Jean Seligmann, 
Flags on the Play: The Supreme Court Takes the Field to Enforce the Rights of Students with Disabilities, 
46 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 481 (2017) (“For those school districts and courts, however, that have relied on a 
narrow reading of Rowley to claim that their IDEA obligations are only procedural or that courts should 
avoid any substantive review of the validity of a school district’s proposed individualized education plan 
(IEP), Endrew F. has blown the whistle and offered an invigorated version of Rowley to guide future 
FAPE dispute resolution.”). 
 133 See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 130 (“For the many 
students with disabilities who have fallen far behind their peers academically due to inadequate special 
education or other reasons, Endrew requires that schools help them catch up.”); Claire Raj & Emily Suski, 
Endrew F.’s Unintended Consequences, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 499, 502 (2017) (noting that the standard the 
Supreme Court set forth for determining FAPE “undoubtedly marks a victory for students with disabilities 
and is markedly better than the ‘more than de minimis’ standard it rejected”). 
 134 See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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A. Integrating Students with Disabilities into General  
Education Classrooms 
One way Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard will significantly 
affect the development of students with disabilities is by explicitly ensuring 
that students with disabilities advance while being fully integrated into 
general education classrooms. This new standard seems to create a high 
presumption in favor of IEPs that focus on “mainstreaming”135 the student 
and ensuring individual progress in the general education curriculum, instead 
of primarily in special education classrooms.136 The opinion’s emphasis on 
this point serves as a reaffirmation of the IDEA’s mandate that school 
districts should guarantee that each child with a disability receives his or her 
educational services in the least restrictive environment (LRE).137 
This presumption in favor of integrating students with disabilities into 
general education will presumably carry with it significant costs to schools 
and school districts, including the costs of administering educational 
programs specific to each child’s circumstances in general education 
classrooms.138 For example, schools may have to expand the use of 
supplemental aids and services in these classrooms in order to provide 
students with disabilities the opportunity to make appropriate progress.139 
 
 135 “Mainstreaming” is a common term used in education to describe the integration of students with 
disabilities into a general education classroom. See Mainstreaming, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mainstreaming [https://perma.cc/J2SR-XX3D]. 
 136 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (“The IEP provisions [of the IDEA] reflect Rowley’s expectation 
that, for most children, a FAPE will involve integration in the regular classroom and individualized 
special education calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade. . . . When a child is fully 
integrated in the regular classroom, as the Act prefers, what that typically means is providing a level of 
instruction reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general curriculum.”); see also 
Spencer J. Salend & Laurel M. Garrick Duhaney, The Impact of Inclusion on Students with and Without 
Disabilities and Their Educators, 20 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 114, 115 (1999) (citing a study that 
found that students with disabilities who were integrated into general education classes were more likely, 
as compared to those children with disabilities who were not enrolled in general education classes, to 
attend postsecondary academic programs, obtain employment and earn higher salaries, live 
independently, be socially integrated into their communities, and be married or engaged). 
 137 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). For a discussion of the IDEA’s LRE mandate, see supra Section 
I.A. 
 138 See LISSA A. POWER-DEFUR & FRED P. ORELOVE, INCLUSIVE EDUCATION: PRACTICAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 68–71 (1997); Therese Craparo, Note, 
Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 467, 494 (2003) (noting that school districts often argue that the costs of providing 
supplemental services necessary to include a child with disabilities in a general education classroom are 
too high); Kevin D. Stanley, Note, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming Compliance Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Board of Education v. Holland, 65 UMKC L. REV. 303, 317 
(1996) (explaining that services for mainstreamed students may result in a reallocation of school funds). 
 139 See Megan Roberts, Comment, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why 
Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2008) (“[F]undamentally the LRE is meant to be the environment in which 
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Additionally, schools may have to hire more support staff that can be 
incorporated into general education classrooms periodically throughout the 
school day.140 
Despite these costs and impacts on school operations, however, the 
implementation of mainstreaming practices emphasized in the Endrew F. 
opinion are likely to have a positive effect on students with disabilities. The 
majority of studies on mainstreaming show that the placement of students 
with disabilities in general education classrooms more positively affects their 
academic achievement compared to their placement in separate special 
education classes.141 These studies show that mainstreaming encourages 
development by exposing students with disabilities to the mainstream 
curriculum, which challenges these students in a way that one-on-one 
instruction does not.142 Mainstreaming also allows these students to observe 
how other students learn, which can help boost language and problem-
solving skills.143 
Incorporating children with disabilities into general education 
classrooms can also have a positive impact on the social development of 
other students. First, mainstreaming promotes diversity within a classroom 
that would not be available in different circumstances.144 Additionally, 
interactions with other students can improve self-esteem in children with 
disabilities as well as improve their active listening abilities and general 
 
a student, with essential supplemental aids and services, can benefit from academic and social 
opportunities.”). 
 140 See Rebecca Beitsch, Special Education Case at Supreme Court Could Prove Costly for Schools, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2016, 11:05 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/special-education-
case-at-supreme-court-could-prove_us_584983dae4b07d4bc0fa2561[https://perma.cc/X73S-Y3HR] 
(“Disability groups that have sided with Endrew . . . say a win for their side could encourage schools to 
improve their special education programs, perhaps by hiring people and using technology that can provide 
more therapy . . . .”). 
 141 See, e.g., Nancy A. Madden & Robert E. Slavin, Mainstreaming Students with Mild Handicaps: 
Academic and Social Outcomes, 53 REV. EDUC. RES. 519, 523–26 (1983) (analyzing various studies that 
demonstrate more academic growth for students with disabilities who were mainstreamed than those in 
self-contained classrooms); Salend & Duhaney, supra note 136, at 114–16 (same). 
 142 See Salend & Duhaney, supra note 136, at 114–16. 
 143 See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that 
language and behavior models taught to others may help with the development of children with 
disabilities); Jeff Grabmeier, Children with Disabilities Benefit from Classroom Inclusion, OHIO ST. U. 
(July 29, 2014, 3:37 PM), https://ehe.osu.edu/news/listing/children-disabilities-benefit-classroom-
inclusion [https://perma.cc/Q5V3-XKLE] (citing a study that found that students with disabilities “get a 
big boost” in their language skills when they interact with other children with good language skills). 
 144 See Lorna Idol, Towards Inclusion of Special Education Students in General Education: A 
Program Evaluation of Eight Schools, 27 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 77, 91 (2006) (finding that 
educators had generally favorable impressions of the impact of students with disabilities on other students 
in their class and vice versa); Stanley, supra note 138, at 316 (“Without question, the great weight of 
evidence points to the positive effects of diversity within the regular classroom.”). 
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social skills.145 Ultimately, while Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard 
and emphasis on LREs may significantly impact the structure of certain 
schools, it should also help foster further academic and social growth among 
students with disabilities as well as other students in the general education 
classroom. 
B. Impact on Public School Operations and Spending 
Endrew F.’s heightened FAPE standard should have a significant 
impact on public school administrators, teachers, and students. In order to 
abide by this new standard, schools may have to provide more individualized 
assistance to students with disabilities, which will, in turn, impact day-to-
day school operations, teachers’ professional development, and resource 
allocation schoolwide. While these changes are likely to affect traditional 
public schools more generally, they will probably have an even greater 
impact on public charter schools due to their funding issues, unique 
structures, and alternative teaching methods, as compared to traditional 
public schools. This Section further examines these impacts by first 
surveying the most plausible ways the Endrew F. holding will alter 
traditional public schools and then evaluating how the new standard 
specifically affects public charter schools. 
1. General Impact on Public Schools 
The appropriate progress standard will likely have a positive effect on 
students with disabilities enrolled in traditional public schools by facilitating 
the provision of more supplemental, individualized aid and a curriculum that 
is more accommodating to their needs. However, in order for students with 
disabilities to receive these benefits, teachers will likely need additional 
educational assistance to better understand the best methods to educate 
them.146 This Section discusses how the appropriate progress standard, and 
the Court’s requirement that a student’s IEP allow for an educational benefit 
 
 145 See William R. Henninger, IV & Sarika S. Gupta, How Do Children Benefit from Inclusion, in 
FIRST STEPS TO PRESCHOOL INCLUSION: HOW TO JUMPSTART YOUR PROGRAMWIDE PLAN 33, 37–43 
(2014) (highlighting the short- and long-term benefits of inclusion); Stanley, supra note 138, at 314 
(highlighting the nonacademic benefits of mainstreaming). 
 146 See generally Mitchell L. Yell & David F. Bateman, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District 
(2017): FAPE and the U.S. Supreme Court, 50 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7 (2017) 
(acknowledging that, under this new standard, teachers must better understand the legal implications of 
special education, the procedures and strategies for effectively incorporating special education students 
into the general education curriculum, how to develop measurable annual goals for students with 
disabilities, and how to monitor those goals using objective data). 
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that is more demanding than the “merely more than de minimis” test, should 
affect the daily lives of teachers and students.147 
Meeting the Endrew F. FAPE standard ultimately makes general and 
special education teachers, school support staff, and administrators more 
accountable by requiring them to develop differentiated curricula to help 
students with disabilities make appropriate progress.148 This standard may 
have the greatest impact on general education teachers, who must now 
familiarize themselves with the needs of students with disabilities.149 Some 
scholars note that Endrew F. will probably lead to a higher volume of 
professional development in evidenced-based teaching practices for both 
general and special education teachers so that these educators will have the 
knowledge necessary to create an individualized special education for 
students with disabilities.150 This programming may include incorporating 
new technology, workbooks, and other teaching objects into the classroom 
to help facilitate learning151 and will allow teachers to master the tools 
 
 147 Of course, the potential changes to the daily lives of teachers and students after Endrew F. will 
depend on the quality of special education classrooms across districts, but those who previously followed 
the “some educational benefit” (de minimis) standard are likely to experience the biggest changes. See 
Understanding the Supreme Court Decision on Students with Disabilities: An Interview with Natasha 
Strassfeld, N.Y.U. STEINHARDT NEWS (June 19, 2017), http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/site/ataglance/2017/06/ 
understanding-the-supreme-court-decision-on-students-with-disabilities-an-interview-with-natasha-
strassfeld.html [https://perma.cc/7JRJ-S49U] (“If a school district maintains fidelity to IDEA’s objective 
of providing a free, appropriate public education to a student with a disability, then Endrew changes very 
little for the day-to-day life of the classroom teacher.”). 
 148 See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017) (requiring school 
districts to provide students with disabilities “individualized special education calculated to achieve 
advancement from grade to grade” in order to satisfy the FAPE standard); see also H. Rutherford Turnbull 
et al., The Supreme Court, Endrew, and the Appropriate Education of Students with Disabilities, 
84 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 124, 136 (2018) (“[E]ducators of these students will need to have knowledge of 
a broad range of academic as well as functional curricula. . . . And they will need to have the depth of 
understanding of curricula, academic as well as functional, to effectively modify and assess progress in 
those curricula for students with disabilities.”); Linda Diamond, Decoding the Impact of the Supreme 
Court Decision on Special Education, CONSORTIUM ON READING EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. (May 19, 2017), 
https://www.corelearn.com/special-ed-blog [https://perma.cc/YAN7-FSHL] (“Because of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, districts will want to equip special education and regular education teachers with the skills 
and knowledge to be able to teach all students to a higher level. This will require better and deeper 
professional development in evidence-based teaching practices . . . . It will require selecting and fully 
implementing the best curricula for all students as well as the most effective materials for teaching 
students already identified with disabilities.”). 
 149 See Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 40 (“[S]chool leaders must ensure employees receive 
effective training in autism, both to be prepared for potential legal challenges and to meet the individual 
needs of the growing number of students with autism.”). 
 150 See id. Through these programs, teachers will learn how to both set up programs to regularly 
monitor student progress and use new resources and materials to respond to these interventions. See id. 
 151 Michael L. Wehmeyer at al., Technology Use by Students with Intellectual Disabilities: An 
Overview, 19 J. SPECIAL EDUC. TECH. 7 (2004) (highlighting the importance and different types of 
technological supplements included into special education curricula in order to assist students). 
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necessary to create a curriculum that encourages individual growth in an 
inclusive classroom setting.152 
It is probable that the Endrew F. standard will also impact the 
administrative demands of educating a student with a disability. Some 
commentators argue that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard now 
mandates that all participants in a child’s IEP meeting evaluate the merits of 
the IEP with increased scrutiny.153 The burden ultimately falls on both 
general and special education teachers to fully understand the potential 
complications of a specific disability and how it impacts an individual 
student’s academic, social, and functional progress.154 Using this 
information, educators and parents must work together to configure a proper 
IEP and then monitor the progress of the student throughout the year to 
ensure that the interventions are sufficient.155 To assist in this process, 
schools may now be more inclined to enlist the services of disability 
education experts to assess the adequacy of an IEP and help teachers 
implement proper interventions.156 Scholars also anticipate that, following 
the implementation of this new standard, school districts will listen to and 
coordinate with parents before and during these meetings even more than 
before.157 
 
 152 Melissa Hecht, What the Endrew F. Supreme Court Case Means for Public Education, RELIAS 
(May 22, 2017), https://www.relias.com/blog/what-the-endrew-f-case-means-for-public-education 
[https://perma.cc/8ARG-7EPG] (“All school staff must have the tools and professional development 
necessary to create an inclusive classroom where all students, including students with disabilities, can 
meet their educational goals.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 40 (stating that IEP teams are mandated to 
“carefully scrutinize segregated placements including self-contained classrooms and alternative 
educational settings”); Michelle Diament, Supreme Court FAPE Ruling May Be a Watershed Moment, 
DISABILITY SCOOP (April 7, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/04/07/supreme-court-fape-
watershed/23553 [https://perma.cc/6LKE-7F8R] (providing a statement from the School Superintendents 
Association suggesting that districts must “make sure that they can provide ‘a cogent and responsive 
explanation’ for the IEPs they produce, particularly for students who are not expected to perform on 
grade-level” (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1002)). 
 154 See Hecht, supra note 152 (explaining how, by setting out a legal precedent that millions of 
students deserve an “appropriately ambitious” education, the Court is requiring that “[a]ll school staff—
administrators, general education teachers, special education teachers, and paraprofessionals—must 
understand how to create and implement an effective and ambitious IEP”). 
 155 Shawn K. O’Brien, Did Endrew F. Change the “A” in FAPE? Questions and Implications for 
School Psychologists, 46 COMMUNIQUÉ 31 (2017). 
 156 See Beitsch, supra note 140 (stating that the Endrew F. decision may encourage schools to 
improve their special education programs by hiring experts, utilizing technology that can provide more 
therapy, or sending existing staff to more training). 
 157 See Waterstone, supra note 132, at 532–33 (noting that the Court’s repeated emphasis on 
procedures for parents and educators to collaborate together is expected to lead to more parent 
involvement in the IEP process); Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District: Academic Achievement 
& Students with Disabilities, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 23, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/cle/materials/2017/05/ce1705asd.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/88FD-
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Finally, the appropriate progress standard should have a significant 
impact on the utilization of special education teachers and support staff, 
including the need for more special education support staff to “push into” the 
general education classroom or “pull out” students into a self-contained 
classroom throughout the school day.158 Raising the FAPE standard above 
the de minimis threshold means that schools residing in these districts must 
also provide more specialized programs for those who need them. Thus, 
students who struggle with mental or emotional disabilities are now more 
likely to receive counseling or a behavior modification program provided by 
disability specialists.159 Additionally, children with physical problems ought 
to gain access to special equipment or physical and occupational therapy 
sessions during the school day.160 
While all of these additional resources and programs appear very 
beneficial for facilitating student growth, critics of the Endrew F. standard 
worry about the costs of these increased inventions,161 especially given that 
school districts already do not receive sufficient funding from the federal 
government to address the needs of students with disabilities.162 For example, 
 
LVGX] (“Advocates argue that one major anticipated change will be that when parents are at IEP 
meetings with the school district, the school will be more willing to listen to parents and give students 
more of what they need up front.”). 
 158 In education, a “push in” model refers to a system in which aides or specialists enter the general 
education classroom to assist a special education student within that environment, while “pull out” 
services are those where an aide or specialist works with a student outside of the general education 
classroom. See Brain Adom, Pull Out and Push In Models in Special Education, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@brainadom895/pull-out-and-push-in-models-in-special-education-d1c8d9ceea13 
[https://perma.cc/WH7J-BKGE]. 
 159 See Holly T. Howell, Comment, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District: How Much Benefit 
is Enough When Evaluating the Educational Needs of Disabled Students in Federally-Funded Public 
Schools?, 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 352 (2016). 
 160 Id. 
 161 During oral argument in Endrew F., Justice Kennedy expressed concerns about the costs 
associated with a program that is reasonably calculated to provide students with disabilities educational 
opportunities that are “substantially equal” to those offered to other students. Howe, supra note 99; see 
also Howell, supra note 159, at 413 (noting the author’s expectation that the Endrew F. decision will be 
costly to school districts). 
 162 See Kathleen Conn, Rowley and Endrew F.: Discerning the Outer Bounds of FAPE?, 345 WEST’S 
EDUC. L. REP. 597, 613 (2017) (“The costs of providing a FAPE for . . . severely disabled children are 
not adequately reimbursed by the federal government under IDEA. The federal government never made 
good on its promise to provide 40% of special education expenditures to school districts. At the present 
time, the federal government covers only 16% of the costs of providing special education services under 
IDEA.”). This funding issue is exacerbated in school districts that provide services to children with 
disabilities through private institutions. For instance, Endrew’s private school tuition was $70,000 per 
year, while Colorado school districts spent an average of $8985 per student. Id. (citing Education 
Spending Per Student Per State, GOVERNING: STATES & LOCALITIES, http://www.governing.com/gov-
data/education-data/state-education-spending-per-pupil-data.html [https://perma.cc/7RNZ-NS56]). If a 
school cannot accommodate a student’s needs because it lacks the resources necessary to ensure that the 
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school districts may incur a variety of additional academic costs for 
differentiated instructional tools and workbooks, professional development 
for teachers, technology, and new curricula. Additionally, the provision of 
counseling, behavioral modification programs, and physical and occupation 
therapy sessions requires the services of costly specialists.163 Finally, schools 
are likely to incur various administrative expenses, including the costs 
associated with hiring disability education experts who can assess an IEP’s 
adequacy or testify about education plans for children if those plans are 
challenged in court.164 
2. Impact on Charter Schools 
Like traditional public schools, charter schools must also comply with 
federal special education laws.165 Thus, it would seem that the Endrew F. 
decision will cause charter schools to experience the same effects 
experienced by traditional public schools, including the provision of more 
resources to students with disabilities by their respective schools. However, 
charter schools differ from traditional public schools in that they experience 
more funding deficiencies, have unique organizational structures, and utilize 
alterative teaching methods.166 All of these factors together possibly make it 
 
child will make appropriate progress, the school may be required to pay for outside private schooling, 
where tuition could cost above $50,000 per year. Id. 
 163 Howell, supra note 159, at 352. 
 164 Beitsch, supra note 140 (“Advocates for administrators said schools likely would be forced to 
boost spending on lawyers and disability education experts to testify about education plans for children, 
as they try to fight off cases from parents seeking more therapy or private school tuition for their child.”). 
 165 Robert A. Garda, Jr., Disabled Students’ Rights of Access to Charter Schools Under the IDEA, 
Section 504 and the ADA, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 516, 519 (2012) (“Charter schools 
operate free from many of the local and state regulations that apply to traditional public schools. But 
charter schools must comply with the federal laws governing disabled students—the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act . . ., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . and Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.”). 
 166 Some commenters note that charter schools have unfavorably impacted students with disabilities 
in the past primarily because they are underfunded, see, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special 
Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 691 (2012) (“Lacking such basic services for disabled 
students precludes charter schools from being a viable school option for most disabled students.”), and 
they cannot provide adequate programming or support for these students, see, e.g., Cheryl M. Lange & 
Camilla A. Lehr, Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities: Parent Perceptions of Reasons for 
Transfer and Satisfaction with Services, 21 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 141, 146–49 (2000) (providing 
anecdotes from scholars and parents of students with special needs about the issues with delivery and 
outcomes for these students who attend charter schools); Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability 
Through Procedure? Rethinking Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1174–75 (2017) (providing an example of a parent from New Orleans—whose 
child had autism, blindness, and a developmental delay—who found that only one of the eight publicly 
funded charter schools she met with had a program that could accommodate her son). Despite these issues, 
enrollment by special needs students in charter schools has increased in recent years, see Lauren Morando 
Rhim et al., Key Trends in Special Education in Charter Schools: A Secondary Analysis of the Civil Rights 
Data Collection 2011-2012, NAT’L CENTER FOR SPECIAL EDUC. IN  
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even more difficult for charter schools to accommodate students with 
disabilities. This Section explains these difficulties in more detail and 
outlines why the Endrew F. holding may actually decrease the enrollment of 
students with disabilities in charter schools. 
Charter schools receive their initial charter from their respective local 
boards of education and depend on their students receiving adequate yearly 
achievement scores in order to renew their charters.167 Like public schools, 
charter schools receive government funding.168 But charter schools differ 
from traditional public schools in that they retain significant discretion 
regarding teaching methods, curricula, and the general school structure, so 
long as their students achieve satisfactory academic outcomes.169 Charter 
schools also differ in the amount of government resources they receive—
these schools are only funded at approximately 64% the rate of their public 
school district counterparts nationwide.170 
These limited resources ultimately make it difficult for charter schools 
to adequately accommodate students with disabilities. In the past, certain 
charter schools have even been found to specifically disregard students with 
complex cognitive and behavioral disabilities, perhaps due to the high costs 
of providing these services.171 As highlighted in the previous Section, 
 
CHARTER SCHS. (Oct. 2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52feb326e4b069fc72abb0c8/t/ 
567b0a3640667a31534e9152/1450904118101/crdc_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5R5-WKSE], and the 
Trump Administration has promoted and increased funding for school choice and the charter school 
movement, arguing that it can benefit students with disabilities, Aria Bendix, Trump’s Education Budget 
Revealed, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/trumps-
education-budget-revealed/519837 [https://perma.cc/V9RJ-JZPS]; Maria Danilova, Do Charter Schools 
Serve Special-Needs Kids? The Jury is Out, SEATTLE TIMES (published May 22, 2017, 12:56 AM; 
updated May 22, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/do-charter-
schools-serve-special-needs-kids-the-jury-is-out [https://perma.cc/A2UB-M4N8]. 
 167 Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1162–63; see also Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring 
Features of Charter School Statutes that Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 
372 (2003) (noting that student performance standards are one of the most common measures states take 
into consideration when deciding whether or not to renew a school’s charter). Some states, such as 
Louisiana, even condition renewal of charter schools based on student improvement on standardized test 
scores. Id. 
 168 See Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School Funding and 
Strategies for Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 HOW. L.J. 1057, 1067–68 (2012) 
(explaining that, although charter schools may receive private grants and loans, most of their funding 
comes from federal, state, and local government sources). 
 169 Id. at 1064. 
 170 Just the FAQs – Charter Schools, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/2012/03/ 
just-the-faqs-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/B5UT-ECDU] (reporting that charter schools average 
$7131 per pupil compared to the per pupil expenditure of $11,184 in traditional public schools). 
 171 See Garda, Jr., supra note 166, at 687–88 (stating that some charter schools are dissuading 
students with severe disabilities—such as autism, traumatic brain injury, or hearing, visual, or orthopedic 
impairments—from enrolling in their schools because of “cost and accountability concerns”); Nancy J. 
Zollers & Arun K. Ramanathan, For-Profit Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities: The Sordid 
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Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard will likely increase the amount of 
resources required to provide disabled students with a FAPE. As a result, 
charter schools may be required to reallocate funds from general education 
programs in order to support students with disabilities. However, 
administrators of these schools will probably be hesitant to redistribute their 
already-limited resources—as mentioned previously, charter schools depend 
on adequate yearly achievement scores to renew their charters,172 and charter 
school administrators are unlikely to remove their already-scarce resources 
from general education classrooms in fear that doing so may lead to a decline 
in the schools’ overall test scores.173 Furthermore, if school administrators 
decide not to reallocate these resources to assist children with disabilities, 
these students may decide not to enroll in charter schools at all. The 
heightening of the FAPE standard post-Endrew F. is therefore likely to create 
new tensions for charter schools. 
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that Endrew F.’s heightened 
requirements will exacerbate the underenrollment of students with 
disabilities in charter schools—especially considering that the additional 
protections afforded under the appropriate progress standard clash with 
teaching methods and school operating procedures employed by many 
charter schools. Commentators note that the charter school movement is 
motivated by the ideas of deregulation and academic outcome 
accountability.174 Over time, in order to achieve the state-mandated academic 
benchmarks, multiple charter schools have developed a “no excuses” model 
 
Side of the Business of Schooling, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 297, 298 (1998) (“While they have done a 
decent job of including students with mild disabilities, for-profit charter schools in Massachusetts have 
engaged in a pattern of disregard and often blatant hostility toward students with more complicated 
behavioral and cognitive disabilities.”). 
 172 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 173 Prior to the Endrew F. decision, scholars noted that “the administrators and teachers that serve 
[charter] schools often prioritize test scores and financial considerations over legal and moral obligations 
to appropriately accommodate and include students with [disabilities].” Stern et al., The Normative Limits 
of Choice: Charter Schools, Disability Studies, and Questions of Inclusion, 29 EDUC. POL’Y 448, 456 
(2015). Given that the Endrew F. holding will likely require even more resources to be devoted to students 
with disabilities, it is reasonable to assume that these issues will only be exacerbated. 
 174 See, e.g., Leman Kaniturk Kose, Challenges of Charter Schools with Special Education: Issues 
of Concern for Charter School Authorizers and Service Providers, 1 MID-ATLANTIC EDUC. REV. 36, 38 
(2013) (noting that “[c]harter operators who are intentionally avoiding bureaucracy may find it hard to 
understand that failing to follow procedural rules could amount to failing to provide an appropriate 
education for students with disabilities”); Garda, Jr., supra note 166, at 660–61 (“The charter movement 
is rooted in the exchange of autonomy and independence for educational results. Regulators judge charter 
schools by the performance of their students, not adherence to mandatory processes. As famously stated 
by President Clinton, they are ‘schools that have no rules.’” (quoting October 6, 1996 Debate Transcript: 
The First Clinton-Dole Presidential Debate, COMM’N PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 6, 1996), 
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-6-1996-debate-transcript [https://perma.cc/L65D-
22K3])). 
113:587 (2018) Is That Appropriate? 
619 
that encourages strict discipline policies so that students would focus solely 
on their schoolwork, in addition to longer school days, heavier workloads, 
and an extended school year.175 Moreover, several charter schools have 
structured their curricula in a way that maximizes the chances of students 
achieving the highest collective test scores, even if that comes at the expense 
of addressing individual needs outside of the tests.176 
Even before Endrew F., the strict, metric-driven philosophy of charter 
schools was not very conducive to the individual, nuanced needs of students 
with disabilities capable of functioning in general education classrooms.177 
Moreover, the independence given to these charter schools may conflict with 
the procedural rights afforded to parents under the IDEA.178 The Court’s 
ruling in Endrew F. may aggravate these same concerns because the more 
demanding substantive FAPE requirements conflict with typical charter 
school operations. For instance, the appropriate progress standard’s 
implications for least restrictive environments and more individualized 
accommodations directly contrast with the strict discipline policies 
administered by many charter schools. Additionally, charter schools’ focus 
on academic outcome accountability clashes with the appropriate progress 
standard, which is based on the student’s holistic needs—including 
behavioral and social–emotional objectives—not just academic outcomes. 
One example from Philadelphia illustrates this problem. Angelique D. 
was enrolled in a distressed charter school that did not have the resources to 
properly evaluate her or provide her with the supplemental aids necessary to 
 
 175 The debate over the “no excuses” model intensified recently when a video surfaced of a charter 
school teacher berating a first grader for failing to explain a math problem correctly, ripping up the 
student’s paper, and having the subdued student sit in the “calm down chair.” See Mark Palko & Andrew 
Gelman, How Schools That Obsess About Standardized Tests Ruin Them as Measures of Success, VOX 
(Aug. 16, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/16/12482748/success-academy-schools-
standardized-tests-metrics-charter [https://perma.cc/H4WW-ESU5]. While advocates argue that this 
“educational tough love” encourages student growth, id., critics of charter schools argue that these 
institutions achieve test results by recruiting the highest achieving students and weeding out 
underperforming students through their rigid disciplinary codes. Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1161; see 
also Evan Horowitz, Do Charter Schools Really Help Children Improve?, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/08/23/charter-schools-boost-test-scores-nothing-
else/D6F7vTwLTqYnBJyeupoODK/story.html [https://perma.cc/2934-WUPX] (finding that the “no 
excuses” charter school model does not translate into better job success). 
 176 See Palko & Gelman, supra note 175 (highlighting the case of Success Academy Charter Schools 
in New York and how the data seems to show that the schools thrive by training the remainder of students 
to perform well on performance tests and excluding those students who are not likely to perform well). 
 177 See Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1173–74. 
 178 See id. at 1183–84 (“[T]he absence of direct accountability avenues—like a publicly elected 
school board—amplifies the problems with the procedures through which students with disabilities can 
vindicate their rights [in charter schools] because such procedures become the only formal mechanism to 
resolve disputes . . . .”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
620 
receive a FAPE under the appropriate progress standard.179 After achieving 
unsatisfactory test scores in previous years, the school was in danger of 
losing its charter and thus forced to funnel all of its limited monetary and 
curriculum resources into ensuring that students in general education 
classrooms succeeded on their yearly achievement tests. Lost in the school’s 
desperate attempts to maintain its charter was Angelique, who the court 
determined should have received 1780.3 more hours of education services 
from the school.180 
Now that charter schools will be forced to address disabled students’ 
needs so that they make more than de minimis progress, it is plausible that 
many of these schools will experience more dilemmas like Angelique’s. 
Although these students will still receive a better education than they 
previously did at their respective public institutions, their choice in schools 
may be limited even further than before. Ultimately, if these students do not 
receive proper resources, they are faced with two undesirable choices: switch 
schools or sue. 
Overall, the Court’s creation of the appropriate progress standard in 
Endrew F. is likely to have a substantial impact on various aspects of the 
current education landscape. As a result, special education programs, 
administrative proceedings, and professional development will significantly 
change—to the benefit and detriment of different individuals within the 
school system. This Part analyzed the probable impact the new standard will 
have on general education integration programs, public school operations 
and spending, and charter schools. However, the discussion provided here is 
just the tip of the iceberg, and questions still remain regarding how Endrew 
F. will impact education reform moving forward. 
IV. CLARIFYING ENDREW F.’S APPROPRIATE PROGRESS STANDARD 
While the appropriate progress standard serves as a preliminary step to 
help protect the needs of special education students, the standard must be 
clarified so that students, parents, and administrators better understand their 
legal rights. Part II observed the wide-ranging interpretations of appropriate 
progress among district courts since Endrew F. and how the ambiguous 
standard has led to vastly different outcomes across jurisdictions. This Part 
presents a solution to this issue by proposing a two-part test to assist courts 
 
 179 See Angelique D. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-1179, 2018 WL 582757, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 
2018). 
 180 Id. (awarding Angelique $71,212 in compensatory damages). The charter school closed in 
December 2014, and Angelique subsequently enrolled in a Philadelphia public school. Id. 
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in clarifying the FAPE standard.181 In doing so, this Part proceeds by first 
addressing the lingering issues following Endrew F., and then outlining the 
proposed test and discussing objective criteria courts can use in determining 
whether the two-part test has been met. 
A. Lingering Issues Following Endrew F. 
While courts and educators want some uniformity to ensure consistency 
across jurisdictions, developing a FAPE standard for all students is 
inherently difficult because no single standard easily applies to all children 
with disabilities.182 During Endrew F.’s oral argument, Justice Sotomayor 
stated her belief that the IDEA provided the Court with enough to set a clear 
standard but noted that the difficulty would be in finding a way to articulate 
it.183 The Endrew F. Court tried to simplify the existing standard by stating 
that, in order to satisfy the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, an IEP must 
contemplate more than a “de minimis educational benefit.”184 But the opinion 
did not clarify what it means to provide an “appropriately ambitious” 
education program or “progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”185 
 
 181 For further discussion on why courts should clarify the interpretation of the FAPE standard, as 
opposed to the Department of Education, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 182 See MacFarlane, supra note 129, at 555 (noting that courts have mostly shied away from defining 
the term “appropriate education” apart from the standard articulated in Endrew F. because it is difficult 
to articulate a nationwide definition when the IDEA is geared toward providing students with “specially 
designed instruction” to meet their unique needs); Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Some 
Educational Benefit or Meaningful Educational Benefit and Endrew F.: Is There a Difference or Is It the 
Same Old Same Old?, 340 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 18 (2017) (“The bottom line is that no ‘one size fits 
all’ standard can be crafted to apply easily to all children with disabilities.”). 
 183 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 
988 (2017) (No. 15–827) https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-
827_gfbh.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN2G-8XD4]. 
 184 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000. 
 185 The United States Department of Education (DOE) provided some guidance on what is 
considered appropriate progress following the Endrew F. decision. See Questions and Answers (Q&A) 
on U.S. Supreme Court Case Decision Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1, U.S. DEPT. OF 
EDUC. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-endrewcase-12-07-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G7K7-5EMF]. The agency’s memorandum focuses on the IDEA’s procedural mandates 
and defers the measure of appropriate progress and “challenging objectives” to local IEP teams. See id. 
According to the DOE, IEP teams must now 
implement policies, procedures and practices relating to (1) identifying present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance; (2) the setting of measurable annual goals, including 
academic and functional goals; and (3) how a child’s progress toward meeting annual goals will be 
measured and reported, so that the Endrew F. standard is met for each individual child with a 
disability.  
Id. The memorandum further discusses the importance of providing special education students with 
supplemental aids and services as well as making “appropriate accommodations.” Id. Ultimately, while 
the DOE’s memorandum provides a broad overview of the impact of Endrew F. on school districts, it 
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Some scholars argue that the Court in Endrew F. merely reiterated what 
was already articulated in Rowley—the idea that special education students 
are not entitled to an equal educational opportunity.186 Additionally, the 
Court’s contention that the IDEA “requires an educational program 
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light 
of the child’s circumstances”187 closely tracks the language in the IDEA, 
which states that “‘[f]ree appropriate public education’ means special 
education and related services that . . . include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.”188 
Finally, the Court’s establishment of a standard that elaborates on the 
meaning of the acronym FAPE using the word “appropriate” provides little 
guidance as to what the term truly means in practice.189 
B. Two-Part Test 
The aforementioned ambiguity has left parents and school board 
officials questioning how to apply the new standard in their schools. This 
Section attempts to clarify this standard by addressing how courts should 
assess whether an IEP would foster appropriate progress. It argues that, in 
order to assess whether an IEP meets this standard, courts should apply a 
two-part test. First, the court should examine whether the school district’s 
procedures are adequate and will help institutions develop individualized 
programs for students with disabilities. Second, the court should determine 
whether the IEP substantively addresses the specific needs of the individual 
student. This Section also proposes certain procedural and substantive 
guideposts that courts may consider in their application of this two-part 
test.190 These procedural and substantive subfactors should be balanced and 
weighed against each other in order to enable courts to consider the unique 
circumstances associated with individual students while also allowing for 
some consistency across different jurisdictions. 
 
does not specify how school districts should best implement this standard, nor does it elaborate on how 
courts should evaluate it. 
 186 Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 36. 
 187 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. 
 188 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012). 
 189 Conn, supra note 162, at 614 (further stating that “[e]xplaining a word by repeating the same 
word is circular reasoning and unhelpful”). 
 190 These criteria largely come from advisory memoranda by the Department of Education offices in 
Massachusetts and Vermont—the states that have provided the most additional guidance following 
Endrew F.—as well as from education experts and existing case law. See, e.g., Memorandum from 
Rebecca Holcombe, Sec’y of Educ., Vt. Agency of Educ., to Superintendents et al., FAPE Obligation 
Under IDEA (July 27, 2017) [hereinafter Holcombe Memo], http://education.vermont.gov/sites/aoe/files/ 
documents/edu-memo-rh-regarding-fape-and-idea.pdf [https://perma.cc/48ZQ-LX7L]. 
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1. Part One: Adequacy of Procedure 
In evaluating whether a particular IEP facilitates appropriate progress, 
courts should first examine the adequacy of the school district’s procedures 
for developing IEPs. In their evaluation, courts should examine the adequacy 
of the resources the school uses to help formulate a student’s IEP goals, the 
data collection procedures implemented by the school to help monitor 
student progress, the school’s consultation with experts and the professional 
development it offers both the general education and special education 
teachers, and the methods the school institutes to provide students who have 
disabilities with support, both behavioral and social–emotional. 
The adequacy-of-procedure analysis should begin with an examination 
of whether a school district uses proper measures and resources in 
formulating a student’s IEP goals. For instance, courts may analyze whether 
a school employed educational experts to independently evaluate the 
sufficiency of the stated IEP goals as well as the proposed methodology to 
be implemented by the teachers to help the student achieve these goals.191 
Furthermore, courts should ensure that schools have procedures in place that 
allow for the routine collection of data regarding a student’s academic and 
behavior progress so that the IEP team will be able to make challenging, yet 
realistic, goals for the student.192 
In addition to consulting with experts and using data to evaluate IEPs, 
courts should also look at whether a school provides adequate guidance and 
professional development to ensure that the teachers and schools 
administering these interventions are qualified to address a student’s 
individual needs.193 This professional development should be geared 
specifically toward teaching educators how to implement different strategies 
 
 191 See Raj & Suski, supra note 133, at 524 (“Expert opinions are central to any well-designed IEP. 
When schools have well-trained and unbiased experts on staff who are able to contribute to IEP 
development, the FAPE standard is likely met.”); Mitchell D. Chester, Advisory on Endrew F. v. Douglas 
County School District RE-1, 2017 U.S. Supreme Court Decision of Special Education, MASS. DEP’T 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (June 16, 2017), http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/advisory/2017-
0616ieps.html [https://perma.cc/9N7V-DKVG] (discussing the Massachusetts Department of Elementary 
& Secondary Education’s emphasis that Endrew F. highlights the importance of educational expertise in 
the process of developing an IEP). 
 192 See Sharita Forrest, What Quality of Education Are Schools Required to Provide to Students with 
Disabilities?, UNIV. OF ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/ 
6367/455713 [https://perma.cc/R6Y6-FZ6U] (recording that University of Illinois special education 
professor James Shriner noted that schools must routinely collect data regarding the academic needs of 
students with disabilities because “[w]ithout the data, you’re just making wild guesses” about what 
constitutes appropriate progress). 
 193 Vermont is an example of a state that has provided exemplary guidance on the expectations of 
qualified teachers. The state has used professional development training to help educators incorporate 
unique procedures and practices into their classrooms as well as accommodate the specific academic 
needs of special education students. See Holcombe Memo, supra note 190. 
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throughout the class period; how to administer, interpret, and use periodic 
assessments; and how to develop meaningful, measurable goals that will help 
establish the success of certain interventions.194 General and special 
education teachers should also be instructed on the basics of education law 
so that they can maintain proper protocol.195 
Finally, in determining whether a particular IEP will foster appropriate 
progress, courts should assess whether the school district has established 
procedures that provide students with behavioral and social–emotional 
support, such as administering functional behavior assessments196 and 
evaluating the adequacy of behavior intervention plans.197 Although recent 
disability education laws, court cases, and professional opinions have 
focused more on ensuring that students with disabilities achieve academic 
improvements through their IEPs than achieve socioemotional 
development,198 for some special education students, receiving the proper 
 
 194 See Yell & Bateman, supra note 146, at 7–10 (outlining recommendations for teachers that would 
ensure that their school districts are abiding by the Endrew F. standard). 
 195 See Holcombe Memo, supra note 190. While the Vermont State Department of Education’s 
guidance would significantly improve special education, the current vast shortage of certified special and 
general education teachers across the United States may make implementing these procedures difficult. 
See Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Availability of Special Education Teachers: Trends and Issues, 
24 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 246, 248 (2003). In California, for instance, school administrators 
describe the need for these educators as “desperate,” leading to the creation of short-term programs that 
do not spend sufficient time training special education teachers. Louis Freedberg & Theresa Harrington, 
Special Education in “Deep Trouble” and Still Needs Reform, Says California Ed Board President, 
EDSOURCE (Oct. 11, 2017), https://edsource.org/2017/california-education-board-president-says-special-
ed-in-deep-trouble-and-needs-reform/588436 [https://perma.cc/5MMW-52CX]. The issue is exacerbated 
in charter schools, which are not obligated under the IDEA to meet certification requirements, leading to 
a shortage of appropriately certified staff to deliver special education services. See Kose, supra note 174, 
at 41. These training programs are expensive, and the cost will be magnified if educators are already 
underqualified. Meeting Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard, however, will require states to make 
the same difficult decisions about resource allocation that Vermont did. 
 196 A functional behavioral assessment is “a systematic process of identifying the purpose—and more 
specifically the function—of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting environmental factors 
that have served the purpose of these behaviors.” Zirkel, supra note 83, at 175 (citing Gregory P. Hanley 
et al., Functional Analysis of Problem Behavior: A Review, 36 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 147 (2003); 
Mark W. Steege & T. Steuart Watson, Best Practices in Functional Behavior Assessment, in 2 BEST 
PRACTICES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY V 337 (Alex Thomas & Jeff Grimes eds., 2008)). 
 197 See Patrick Ober, Proactive Protection: How the IDEA Can Better Address the Behavioral 
Problems of Children with Disabilities in Schools, 1 BELMONT L. REV. 311, 335 (2014) (proposing that 
functional behavioral assessments and behavior interview plans be required in the IEPs of students with 
disabilities because they will proactively address the behavior problems of these students). For more 
information on behavior intervention plans, see supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 198 See Kevin Golembiewski, Disparate Treatment and Lost Opportunity: Courts’ Approach to 
Students with Mental Health Disabilities Under the IDEA, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 473, 485 (2016) (“Courts 
frequently interpret ‘educational’ to mean ‘academic.’ Consequently, as long as a student is able to make 
progress in traditional academic areas, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, she will be denied services 
even if she is not making progress in a number of areas that are critical to self-sufficiency.” (citing R.B. 
v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2007))); Zirkel, supra note 83, at 209–10 
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behavior management education is imperative to making academic 
progress.199 Thus, IEPs should incorporate adequate behavior services in 
order to foster appropriate progress.200 Ultimately, for courts to hold school 
districts to the appropriate progress standard, they necessarily must examine 
districts’ procedures. 
2. Part Two: Adequacy of the IEP’s Substantive Goals 
In addition to the procedural criteria discussed above, courts should also 
examine the substantive goals of the individual child’s IEP in determining 
whether the IEP will promote appropriate progress. The evaluation of the 
substantive goals of a student with disabilities should assess whether the 
school used an objective comparative analysis that scrutinizes a student’s 
IEP compared with that student’s past performance, the IEPs of other 
students, and different state and local educational standards; whether the IEP 
contemplates the use of data and technology to enhance student learning; and 
whether the school district implemented vocational assessments when 
crafting IEPs for students who may not plan on attending college. 
In its review, courts should first ensure that the IEP team, in its 
development of an individual student’s IEP, considered past performance as 
a benchmark in deciding whether the current IEP adequately fosters 
appropriate progress.201 Mere repetitions of goals and objectives from the 
student’s previous IEPs should be considered “red flags.”202 The language of 
a child’s IEP must also be scrupulously compared to other students’ IEPs to 
 
(highlighting that, since the 1997 IDEA Amendments, there has been a decrease in the professional push 
for, as well as policymaking receptivity to, proactively ensuring that students with disabilities improve 
their behavior; experts and lawmakers instead emphasize the importance of academic improvement for 
special education students). 
 199 See Kathleen L. Lane et al., Serving Students with or At-Risk for Emotional and Behavior 
Disorders: Future Challenges, 25 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 507, 511–12 (2002) (citing a study 
suggesting that behavioral issues may result in academic underachievement); Craig F. Spiel et al., 
Evaluating the Content of Individualized Education Programs and 504 Plans of Youth Adolescents with 
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 29 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 452, 452 (2014) (describing how students 
with ADHD experience serious academic impairments because of their behavior). 
 200 JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 130. These programs 
include positive behavioral interventions and supports as well as behavior intervention plans that help 
special education students cope with the varying problems they experience each day. 
 201 Bill Crane, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F., MASS. ADVOCS. FOR CHILD.: BILL’S 
BLOG (June 27, 2017, 1:50 PM), https://massadvocates.org/bills-blog-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-
endrew-f [https://perma.cc/N68U-3JRN] (providing commentary from a former hearing officer at the 
Bureau of Special Education Appeals discussing the Massachusetts State Board of Education’s best 
practices following Endrew F.). 
 202 Rachel Seelig & Marlyn Mahusky, Endrew F.: What the Supreme Court Has to Say About Special 
Education, VT. LEGAL AID (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.vermontfamilynetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/VFN-Webinar-Slides-Endrew-F.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NBG-VXE9]. 
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ensure that they are individualized and appropriately ambitious.203 
Additionally, the team should craft a student’s IEP goals and objectives using 
the guidance of the local or state educational standards to ensure that they 
are sufficiently challenging.204 Finally, courts should confirm that the school 
district evaluated the child’s IEP goals using objective, peer-reviewed 
research data collection procedures and teaching methods so that teachers 
who may not have the appropriate knowledge or experience are not forced 
to make subjective decisions.205 
In determining whether the second part of this test is met, courts should 
also evaluate whether school districts utilize objective, data-driven standards 
to develop a student’s yearly goals.206 Specifically, courts should look at 
whether schools districts assess progress based on data collected from 
periodic evaluations and assessments of a student’s academic and behavioral 
performance.207 IEP teams can use this data to institute appropriate, research-
based remedies that would enhance student learning,208 and school districts 
may utilize technology to assist in this endeavor.209 
While the above-mentioned methods would assist in crafting an 
appropriately ambitious IEP for students preparing to attend secondary 
education institutions, the analysis likely differs for a child whose disability 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 See MacFarlane, supra note 129, at 555–56 (“In order to assess the appropriateness of a particular 
stage of the educational process of a student, the parties need look at the student’s progress and 
individualized education program in the context of his/her overall educational process within state and 
local standards as well [] as within the context of the current information that the team is reviewing.”). 
 205 “The Court’s signal in Endrew F. is . . . to hold school districts to account for their choices and 
proposals [when educating students with disabilities] with reasons that are ‘cogent and responsive.’” 
Seligmann, supra note 132, at 493 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 173 S. Ct. 988, 
1002 (2017)). School districts can justify their decisions through the use of special education experts, 
objective data, and by keeping sufficient records of student intervention methods. See John W. 
Borkowski, The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in Endrew, ILL. ALL.  
ADM’RS SPECIAL EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.smore.com/app/attachments/download/ 
59d1765b99bb565e90b52ff0 [https://perma.cc/H34J-NRMN] (cautioning schools to use experts and 
objective data and also to keep sufficient records of student intervention methods, since these schools are 
required to provide justifications for their decisions). 
 206 Crane, supra note 201. 
 207 Turnbull et al., supra note 148, at 135. 
 208 See Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL 3278945, at *7 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 
2017) (noting that every IEP must be “based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable”); A.G. 
v. Bd. of Educ., No. 16 CV 1530, 2017 WL 1200906, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (referencing the 
importance of research-based programs and reading systems). 
 209 See Dave L. Edyburn, Critical Issues in Advancing the Special Education Technology Evidence 
Base, 80 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7, 17 tbl. 1 (2013) (discussing how digital learning devices, digitalization, 
and the collection of data through technological means assists in improving special education). One 
example of such technology is the Illinois IEP Quality Project, which is a web-based tutorial and decision-
making support system that helps educators create quality IEPs, plan instruction, and prioritize goals for 
each student in relation to his or her needs and state learning goals. Forrest, supra note 192. 
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may hinder his or her ability to attend a four-year college or university. 
Courts should address these cases by stressing the use of “vocational 
assessments,”210 tests that help students with disabilities identify their 
strengths and passions as well as find jobs that correspond to their interests.211 
Courts should examine whether school districts used these assessments, 
along with other objective criteria, to establish realistic goals for a student to 
achieve after high school, and then used reverse engineering to create an IEP 
that addresses the skills the student will need to possess in order to succeed 
in that vocation.212 Depending on the individual circumstances, a student’s 
IEP may be targeted toward teaching that child academic skills, daily living 
skills, personal and social skills, or occupational skills.213 
In sum, this Section sought to provide further guidance that would help 
courts evaluate whether the appropriate progress standard was met in a given 
case. The two-part test and corresponding guidance discussed in this Section 
would help courts evaluate whether a particular IEP has met the appropriate 
progress standard and would enable courts to make more consistent decisions 
regarding whether a student was denied a FAPE. Scrutinizing a school 
district’s procedures and the substantive quality of an IEP should ultimately 
help courts feel more comfortable in making these determinations, while also 
allowing school districts and parents to better understand their legal rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F. sought to clarify the more-
than-thirty-year circuit split created after Rowley. The standard established 
by Endrew F. should be read to provide further protection for special 
education students, even if it has consequences in other areas of education 
and requires significant systemic reform in certain school districts. The 
Court’s articulation of the broad appropriate progress standard does create 
new problems, however, as shown by the divergent interpretations already 
occurring at the lower court level. To address this confusion, this Note has 
proposed a two-part test that examines the adequacy of a district’s 
procedures for developing IEPs and the substantive merits of an individual 
student’s IEP. While the adoption of this test should mitigate some of the 
outstanding confusion following Endrew F., several questions still remain 
 
 210 See, e.g., F.L. v. Bd. of Educ., 274 F. Supp. 3d 94, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (highlighting the use of 
vocational assessments as a mechanism to help determine whether a student’s IEP was appropriate). 
 211 Edward M. Levinson & Eric J. Palmer, Preparing Students with Disabilities for School-to-Work 
Transition and Postschool Life, COUNSELING 101, Apr. 2005, at 11, 12, https://my.vanderbilt.edu/ 
specialeducationinduction/files/2011/09/Transition-Planning1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UDE-ETEX]. 
 212 See Seelig & Mahusky, supra note 202. 
 213 Levinson & Palmer, supra note 211, at 12. 
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regarding which criteria should be used to determine the upper limits of the 
FAPE requirement. Ideally, district and circuit courts will expound on this 
standard and provide further guidance so that parents and school officials 
can better understand their rights and expectations under the new standard. 
Regardless, the Endrew F. holding should be seen as a victory for the special 
education community that will better protect students and ensure that their 
rights and opportunities under the IDEA are met. 
